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Abstract
Quantum physics has made an important new entry into technological applications by use of
the fundamental principles of quantum indeterminacy and measurement: to provide secrecy be-
tween two communicating parties. As this and other modern applications of quantum information
become available, there is a need to provide teaching laboratories that illustrate them. In this
article we present a laboratory demonstration of quantum key distribution with single photons,
where the secrecy of the communication is ensured by the principles of quantum superposition and
state projection. We implement this experience using a table-top apparatus, of the kind used com-
monly in undergraduate laboratories, where polarization-entangled states are used to implement
the Bennett-Brassard-84 protocol. The experiment shows how the communication between two
parties using entangled states is disrupted by an eavesdropper. We use a simple optic to mimic
the role of the eavesdropper in intercepting, measuring and resending the photons used in the
communication. We also provide an analysis of the state of the light to show how the eavesdropper
changes it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Exploration of quantum physics has led to many applications that are based on energy
quantization of matter and its interaction with radiation. Quantum entanglement is a fun-
damental property of quantum systems that has recently moved from being a scientific
curiosity to becoming central to modern and emerging applications. It is the basis of many
phenomena investigated under the umbrella name of quantum information, where quantum
states of light and matter are used to encode and process information.1,2 This field has been
partly stimulated by technological advances, but mainly from a renewed appreciation of
quantum physics. Educationally, this has led to new ways of teaching quantum mechanics
by the use of textbooks that put more focus on linear algebra than on wave mechanics, and
of laboratories that illustrate the fundamentals of quantum mechanics directly.3
By enabling applications, quantum technologies are becoming relevant to fields well be-
yond physics and chemistry, such as engineering and computer science. Thus, the academic
community has to create curricula to educate an emerging workforce. One of the first ap-
plications to arise in quantum information uses the fundamentals of quantum physics to
ensure the secrecy of communication by generating a secure cryptographic key in which to
encrypt messages. The advantage of the technique is that it can reveal the presence of an
eavesdropper if the communication is compromised. The technique is known as quantum
key distribution (QKD). Interest in this technology became more intense by work on the
development of a quantum computer. One of the tasks that a quantum computer will do
easily and quickly is the decoding of cryptographic keys used commonly today. As an alter-
native, QKD uses quantum physics to generate cryptographic keys that provide immunity
against eavesdropping. QKD will also provide security into the future, as a future quantum
computer will not be able to decode past secret communications. The development of this
technology has made significant progress and is already being offered commercially as an
alternative in secret communications.
At a fundamental level, this application is based on the transmission of a single photon
in a quantum state by a sender, and in the measurement of this state by a receiver. In its
most simple form, the apparatus can have two settings: in one setting the photon is in a
pure state and is measured with absolute certainty; in the other setting the photon is in a
state of superposition, and the result of the measurement is indeterminate. The same would
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be true of an eavesdropper trying to extract the information carried by the photon. If the
eavesdropper intercepts the photon in a state of superposition, no useful information will be
extracted form it, and in resending the photon to avoid revealing the intrusion, the photon
will no longer be in the initial state. Instead it will be in a state modified by the act of
measurement by the eavesdropper. This modification of the state of the photon can be used
by the sender and receiver to recognize the presence of an eavesdropper. The experiment
also demonstrates the non-classical essence of quantum physics, succinctly put by P.A.M.
Dirac:4 when measuring a photon in a superposition of two states, the photon “has to make
a sudden jump from being partly in each of these two states to being in entirely one or the
other of them.” More generally, the act of measurement and gaining information from it
produces a disturbance,5 and the disturbance can be detected.
The teaching of this technological application of quantum physics is already facilitated
by an excellent textbook,6 and a more general tutorial on the subject in a recent book,7
but more explanations can be found online (searching for QKD). Instructional research
on this technique has received recent attention.8,9 Teaching-laboratory demonstrations that
use common light sources (e.g. lasers, LED’s) either home-made10 or commercial11 involve
many photons. They provide an illustration of the principle but do not demonstrate the
phenomenon with single quanta. We have developed and implemented a table-top exper-
iment that uses single photons to illustrate and demonstrate the fundamental principles
behind this application, and are in the process of adapting it into a curricular offering. To
our knowledge this type of laboratory exercise has not been presented before.
In this article we present our development of this laboratory experience. In Sec. II we
explain the fundamental principles. Then in Sec. III we present the laboratory technique,
with Sec. IV presenting the results. In Sec. V we present the results of using the technique
of quantum state tomography to measure the state of the light within the context of QKD.
In Sec. VI we present our conclusions. We provide two appendices. Appendix A has a brief
description of the encryption of the communication once the key is obtained, and Appendix B
has information about implementing quantum state tomography.
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II. THE UNDERLYING QUANTUM PRINCIPLE
One of the postulates of quantum mechanics is that a device that measures a physical
quantity on a system is represented by an operator. The outcome of a measurement is
an eigenvalue of the operator. After the measurement, the system is left in the eigenstate
corresponding to the eigenvalue.12 If the initial state of the system is one of the eigenstates of
the measurement apparatus, then a measurement will leave the system in the same state with
unit probability; but when the initial state is not an eigenstate, then the act of measurement
projects the initial state onto one of the eigenstates of the measuring device with a probability
equal to the absolute value squared of the inner product of the initial and final states. Once
the state is projected, it has no memory of the initial state. A consequence of this postulate
is that when we do a measurement we are likely to disturb the state of the system so to
change it in an irrevocable way. The probabilistic outcome further embodies another aspect
of quantum physics: the outcome of an act of measurement is inherently random weighted by
the corresponding probability. Thus, there is no way to know beforehand with full certainty
which eigenstate will be the final state.
A second important quantum principle for QKD is the no-cloning theorem: the state of
a system cannot be cloned.13 If our system is, for example, a photon in an arbitrary state,
we cannot duplicate the state without destroying the initial state. This theorem has an
easily accessible analytical demonstrations.14,15 Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that
we can destroy the initial state of the system and recreate it in a remote location without
physically sending it, a process known as quantum teleportation.16,17 This finding is also
easily described analytically within the introductory quantum mechanics formalism.14,15,18
The two aspects of quantum principles outlined above can be used for a secure communi-
cation: If we send a single photon in a quantum state, then if an eavesdropper intercepts the
photon to measure its state and resend it (known as intercept-resend action), it will likely
modify the state of the photon, introducing errors that will reveal that the communication
has been compromised. The sender and receiver can use state superposition to exchange
information. In doing so they need to sacrifice part of the communication to identify a possi-
ble intrusion. This quantum exchange is not practical to do with the actual communication,
so it is instead done for generating the key used to encrypt the message (see Appendix A
for an example). The use of a one-time key, generated with each communication, ensures
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security.19,20 Quantum key distribution (QKD) is thus a method of producing a secret key
based on quantum principles. This is a topic of current research, as efforts to improve its
implementation and error correction are ongoing. They include various types of encoding
besides polarization (discussed here), such as energy-time entanglement, distributed phase
and continuous variables.20,21 Novel directions in this technology include the potential use of
high-dimensional states.22 Currently the challenges of single-photon sources (efficiency and
cost) are overcome by the use of attenuated beams (with more than one photon per pulse),
but encoded with intensity variations and selective use of pulses in a way that mitigates the
eavesdropping done by splitting the pulse, a method called decoy-state.23,24 This technology
is already in place and commercially available by vendors such as IDQuantique, MagiQ and
Quantum XChange. However, research on single-photon QKD continues and may become
a reality in the future with technological advances.25
A. BB84 protocol
The most basic and effective technique for quantum encryption was invented by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984, known as the BB84 protocol.26 It uses the polarization of the light,
a 2-state system, consisting of horizontal and vertical polarizations states (picking a simple
coordinate system), and one of its two mutually unbiased bases (MUB), diagonal (+45◦
from horizontal) and antidiagonal (−45◦ from horizontal). In MUB’s, all eigenstates of one
basis are measured with equal probability by the states of the other basis. This is a critical
component of QKD: If we send information in the form of a state in one basis, then a
measurement in another MUB will yield no information about the initial state.
We can put this in a more analytical form. If our basis consists of the states of horizontal
and vertical polarization |H〉 and |V 〉, respectively, then the (MUB) diagonal basis states
are
|D〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) , (1)
|A〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) . (2)
Measuring a photon initially in state |D〉 using the horizontal-vertical (HV) basis, projects
states |D〉 and |A〉 onto state |H〉 with probability
PH = |〈H|D〉|2 = |〈H|A〉|2 = 1/2, (3)
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and similarly, onto state |V 〉 with probability
PV = |〈V |D〉|2 = |〈V |A〉|2 = 1/2. (4)
Thus, measurement of the photon in state |D〉 or |A〉 yields no information about the state
when measured in the HV basis. Similarly, a photon initially in state |H〉 measured using
the diagonal-antidiagonal (DA) basis also yields no information about the initial state of the
photon because it gets projected to states |D〉 or |A〉 with equal probability. However, if we
measure the state of the photon (e.g. |H〉) in the basis where its state is one of the eigenstates
(i.e., HV basis), then we obtain the state of the photon (|H〉) with unit probability.
The idea for the protocol is then that the sender, normally called Alice, sends a photon
in an eigenstate of a given basis to the receiver, normally called Bob. The basis in which
Alice sends her photon is generated randomly. Bob also picks the detection basis randomly.
For this, both agree on a convention on the information, such as, for example, |H〉 and |D〉
states constituting a “1,” and |V 〉 and |A〉 constituting a “0”. When Alice and Bob use the
same basis, then Bob will get the state of Alice’s photon; but when they use different bases,
then there is probability of 1/2 that Bob will not get the state sent by Alice. Instead he
will get the state orthogonal to one sent by Alice.Because of this, after completion of the
communication, Alice and Bob must compare the bases that they used (but not the results
of the measurements), and throw away the data that was obtained when they used different
bases. Bob will get Alice’s state when he uses the same basis as Alice, and so they only keep
those data (i.e., a sequence of 1’s and 0’s), which becomes the key.
For this to work Alice needs to send only one photon. If she sends a beam, consisting
of many photons in the same state, then the eavesdropper can use a beam splitter to get
a sample of the photons and then measure them without disturbing the communication. If
only one photon is used in the communication, then an eavesdropper will have to measure it.
She will have to pick a basis, and if she does not pick the same basis as Alice, then she will
introduce detectable errors in the communication due to her modification of the state of the
photon. A convenient source of single photons uses spontaneous parametric down-conversion
to produce photon pairs to later detect them at coincident arrival times.3 Attenuated beams
are not a good source of single photons because there is a finite probability of more than
one photon traveling at any given time.3
A third element of the communication between Alice and Bob involves the random choice
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of Alice’s initial state (i.e., for sending a random sequence of 1’s and 0’s). The quantum
physics of entangled photons already has an inherent randomness that can be used for this
purpose.27 If we use entangled states of 2 photons that Alice and Bob can share, such as the
state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉1|H〉2 + |V 〉1|V 〉2) , (5)
where 1 and 2 stand for Alice and Bob’s photon, respectively, then a measurement in the
HV basis has an intrinsic probability of 1/2 of resulting in a 1 (i.e., measuring |H〉) or
a 0 (i.e., measuring |V 〉). For example, if Alice creates a pair of entangled photons in
the state given by Eq. 5, keeps one photon and sends the other one to Bob, then if Alice
performs a measurement on her photon in the HV basis, she will obtain |H〉
1
or |V 〉
1
with 1/2
probability in each case. In doing so, she also projects the state of the photon heading toward
Bob to |H〉2 or |V 〉2, respectively. (This is a useful way to think of it although quantum
mechanics predicts the correlations but not causal actions.) Thus, quantum indeterminacy
is responsible for deciding whether Alice and Bob share a 1 or a 0. More strictly, Alice’s
measurement is a projection of the state, which in turn defines the state of the photon
received by Bob. If the outcome of her measurement is horizontal, then the projection
becomes
|H〉1〈H|1 ψ〉 =
1√
2
|H〉1|H〉2, (6)
and similar for the other possible outcome
|V 〉1〈V |1 ψ〉 =
1√
2
|V 〉1|V 〉2. (7)
In both cases the probability is the square of the probability amplitude, the factor multi-
plying the product states listed above.
An excellent student exercise is to use Eqs. 1 and 2 to show that the entangled state
given by Eq. 5 can be transformed to the DA basis, yielding
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|D〉1|D〉2 + |A〉1|A〉2) , (8)
also a superposition of the two possibilities where both photons are parallel to each other.
This means that when Alice creates the entangled state she can measure it in either basis,
and if Bob uses the same basis, he will be obtaining the same state Alice obtained, and
therefore the same data. Should they use different bases, they will incur in the same type
of errors described above.
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In our demonstration, shown schematically in Fig. 1, we use the process of spontaneous
parametric down-conversion to create pairs of polarization-entangled photons in the state
of Eq. 5 (or equivalently, Eq. 8). In an implementation, this would be done on Alice’s end,
with Alice keeping one of the photons and sending the other one to Bob. Both would use
a method of separating spatially the photons by the state in which they are measured. We
used polarizing splitters for both, so that when the photon reaches the appropriate detector
it can be counted as 1 or 0.
FIG. 1. Schematic of the BB84 protocol applied to entangled photons.27 The sender, Alice, gener-
ates photon pairs in the polarization-entangled state of Eq. 5, keeps one photon and proceeds to
measure it in one of two possible bases: HV or DA. The other photon goes to Bob, who does the
same, although Alice and Bob choose their bases randomly. Between Alice and Bob is Eve, the
eavesdropper, who measures the state of the photon going to Bob guessing one of the two bases
and resending the state that she measured.
B. Eve
An important step in this demonstration is to implement Eve. What does Eve do? As
Eve intercepts the photon she needs to pick a basis: HV or DA. Once she picks it, she makes
a measurement with a polarizing splitter and 2 detectors. Thereafter she resends the photon
to Bob in the same state that she detected.
There are two cases depending on Eve’s choice of basis:
1. Case I: Eve picks the same basis as Alice and Bob. If Eve picks the same basis as Alice,
then she measures the same state as Alice. She resends it to Bob, and if Bob measures
it in the same basis, then he will get the same outcome as Eve, and consequently the
same as Alice. In this case, Eve’s interception was successful: she measured Bob’s
photon without him being able to know that she intercepted it.
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2. Case II: Eve picks a different basis than Alice and Bob. Let us now consider the
other possibility: Alice measures, for example, in the HV basis and gets state |H〉 as
outcome, but Eve picks the other basis (DA). Eve does not know that it is the wrong
basis, and so she gets an outcome (state |D〉 or |A〉 with probability 1/2) and resends
the photon in that state to Bob. Subsequently, Bob makes a measurement. If Bob
does not pick the same basis as Alice (HV), then the outcome is immaterial because
the data would be discarded anyway, as mentioned earlier. If Bob picks the same basis
(HV) he expects the correct outcome, but because Eve measured in the wrong basis,
she resends the outcome that she got (|D〉 or |A〉). As a consequence, Bob has only
1/2 probability of getting the correct outcome (|H〉) in his basis.
In implementing Eve’s action, our apparatus should mimic the two possibilities presented
above. It would be best to set up the intercept-resend action by Eve, but that is not
possible for practical reasons: because it involves absorbing a down-converted photon and
the re-emitting it, which is not easily done in our demonstration. The alternative is to
mimic Eve, not by absorbing the photon and re-emitting it, but by modifying it in such a
way as to destroy the entanglement when Eve choses the wrong basis (i.e., different than
Alice and Bob), and preserving it when she chooses the right basis (i.e., same as Alice and
Bob). There is a transmissive optical method that can do this, described below, so that our
implementation of Eve fulfills its role in our demonstration.
The final step is to record single-photon events at Alice’s and Bob’s ends and generate
a key. For completeness, in Appendix A we describe how Alice and Bob communicate once
they have the key.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The apparatus used for this demonstration is shown in Fig. 2. We used a source of
polarization-entangled photons. This setup has been described extensively before.28,29
Briefly, we use a gallium-nitride diode laser operating with only current control (prices
start at about $20 for the cheapest laser “pointers,” but more reliable ones are available
commercially for a few hundred dollars). This laser had a wavelength of 402.5 nm and
output of about 50 mW. A bandpass filter removed infra-red light from the laser. For the
initial alignment, the full power was used, but for the experiments we attenuated the beam
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by polarization projection using a half-wave plate and 2 polarizers in series (to increase the
extinction ratio in the orthogonal direction), with the final polarization aligned horizontal.
After a steering mirror (see Fig. 2), a HWP flipped the polarization to about 45-degrees
from horizontal. It was followed by a quartz wave-plate of about 8 mm in thickness. The
down-conversion into polarization-entangled states uses two thin type-I beta-barium borate
(BBO) crystals rotated 90 degrees relative to each other,28 which are now quite standard
and commercially available (see Table I). The quartz crystal was necessary to temporally
shift the pairs coming from the two crystals so that it becomes indistinguishable from which
crystal the photons were produced.30 The tilt of the crystal also provided adjustment of the
relative phase between the two polarization possibilities to put the photons in the state of
Eq. 5.
FIG. 2. Apparatus for implementing QKD with entangled photons (see text). Optical compo-
nents include: HWPs (Hwp), polarizer (P), quartz plate (Qp), beta-barium borate crystal (BBO),
alignment laser (A) Thompson prism (TP, polarizing beam splitter (Pbs), and band-pass filters
(F).
The photon pairs at nearly the same energy (or wavelength of 805 nm) followed two non-
collinear paths. They reached identical detection setups for Alice and Bob that consisted
of a HWP followed by a polarization splitter. We tried two different type of splitters.
The most inexpensive ones were polarizing beam splitters (about $250 each), which are
widely available. They transmit exclusively horizontally polarized photons and reflect mostly
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TABLE I. Parts list.
Part Make and Model Price each ($)
Laser Power Technology PM50(405)G35 1000
BBO crystals Newlight Photonics PABBO5050-405(I)-HA3 1000
Quartz crystal Newlight Photonics QAR25550-A-AR405 429
Thompson prism Lambda Research CGTS-08 770
Wollaston option1 Optosigma WPPB-06-14SN 550
Detectors Excelitas/Alpha SPCM-EDU CD3375 1700
Coincidence unit Red Dog Physics CD48 300
Motorized rotation stage Pacific Laser 450
1 Alternative to Thompson prism.
vertically polarized photons. Because of a small contamination of horizontal polarization in
the reflection (10-15%), we followed the splitter with a vertical polarizer, as shown in the
figure. This lead to some imbalance in the detection probability so we opted for a different
splitter: a Thompson prism. This is an optical element made of calcite that transmits
vertically-polarized photons and reflects at 45 degrees horizontally polarized photons, both
with high degree of purity. We already had these prisms, but they are an expensive option
(see Table I). A less expensive option is a Wollaston prism.
Past the splitters we had fiber collimators connected to multimode fibers that channeled
the light to 4 single-photon detectors . Before the collimators we had 40-nm band-pass filters.
The signals from each detector reached an electronic unit that recorded the detector pulses
as they arrived and also recorded “coincidences” (pulses from Alice and Bob that arrived
within about 50 ns). Our unit was based on a field programmable gate array integrated
circuit (Altera model DE2), which is no longer available, but there is a new option listed in
Table I. The electronic unit was controlled by a laptop via a Matlab program.31
To implement Eve we needed to modify the state of the photon heading toward Bob in
a way that mimicked the effect of intercept and resend, as mentioned above. Case I above
is easily achieved with a polarization interferometer that uses the same basis as Alice and
Bob. This is a 2-path interferometer with polarizing beam splitters such that the light in
state |H〉 goes through one path and light in state |V 〉 goes through the other path. The
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challenge is to mimic case II: that Bob has 1/2 probability of obtaining the wrong state once
Eve picks a basis that is different than the one used by Alice and Bob. This can be achieved
also by a polarization interferometer, as mentioned above, but with unequal path-length, as
shown in the insert to Fig. 2, provided that the difference in path length is greater than the
coherence length of the light.
We explain the effect of the unbalanced interferometer by way of an example: If the
photon sent by Alice is in state |D〉, the horizontal and vertical components (states) are in
phase (Eq. 1). If the photon meets Bob’s polarization splitter in the DA basis, then it goes to
the D output with probability 1. If before reaching Bob’s splitter Eve separates the horizontal
and vertical components of the photon and delay one relative to the other for a distance
longer than their coherence length, then these two components become incoherent. When
the paths get recombined, state |D〉 is not recreated because the light is in an incoherent
combination of |H〉 and |V 〉 states. It is equivalent to the photon being in state |H〉 half the
time and in state |V 〉 the other half of the time. That is, the diagonal state of the photon has
been converted from a coherent superposition of horizontal and vertical states into a “mixed”
state. From a fundamental perspective, the effect of the unbalanced interferometer is to make
a measurement in the HV basis in the first polarization splitter and subsequently channel the
paths so that regardless of the state into which photon was measured, it continues toward
Bob. We can also think that state |D〉 of Eq. 1 is a superposition of two indistinguishable
possibilities (states |H〉 and |V 〉). The unbalanced interferometer makes the two possibilities
distinguishable because the path length difference is longer than the length of the photon
wavepacket (determined by the bandwidth of the filters), and so a timing measurement could
in principle reveal whether the photon took the short path (being in state (|H〉) or the long
path (being in state |V 〉).
When the light in this incoherent state reaches Bob’s polarization splitter, it will have 1/2
probability of reaching either detector. Likewise, if we place two half-wave plates (HWP)
set to 22.5◦ from the horizontal, one before and one after, then the first HWP transforms
respectively the |D〉 and |A〉 states to the |H〉 and |V 〉 states temporarily. After the inter-
ferometer the second HWP transforms the states back. This effectively decoheres the two
diagonal components, mimicking intercept and resend in the DA basis.
We started the experiments by implementing the interferometer mentioned above. It
had some alignment challenges. However, we discovered that a thick quartz plate (of 8
12
mm thickness) would do the same due to the short coherence length of the down-converted
photons (about 16 µm, or 54 fs coherence time, when using 40-nm band-pass filters), as
had been done before.32 The quartz plate delays the polarization components along its fast
and slow axes by about 207 fs, which is enough to decohere the components of the down-
converted photon along the fast and slow axes of the plate. Moreover, by just rotating the
fast axis of the quartz plate to the diagonal direction we could decohere the polarization
states along the diagonal direction. It was a much simpler alternative for implementing Eve.
Finally, by way of advice, there were two challenging aspects of the experiment. The
first one was placing the detectors at the proper locations, at the outputs of the polarization
splitters, so that they gave complementary signals. It involved iterations with the signals
and detector positions for all the settings of the bases. The second challenge was to get the
data acquisition to measure low counting rates for the chosen counting interval. Without any
attenuation we would get about 200 coincidences per second when Alice and Bob were set
to the same basis. We had to reduce this to an average of 1 coincidence count per interval.
We accomplished this by first reducing the counting interval to the minimum possible: 0.1 s,
determined by our coincidence-circuit unit. We then attenuated the pump beam so that it
fed a very weak photon stream to the down-conversion crystal. This entailed a band-pass
filter, to make sure only pump photons went through (some diode lasers produce a weak
infra-red glow that interferes with the measurements) followed by a HWP and two horizontal
polarizers as already mentioned.
IV. RESULTS
Our data acquisition then consisted of an apparatus that produced pairs of entangled
photons, one going to Alice and another one to Bob through Eve. The choice of basis for
Alice and Bob was done by the setting of the HWP that preceded the respective polarization
splitter (0◦ for HV and 22.5◦ for DA). The base choice for Eve was determined by the
angular orientation of the fast axis of the quartz wave plate (0◦ for HV and 45◦ for DA).
The rotational mounts that we had were motorized and USB-controlled. We note that there
are 3-D printed alternatives for the rotational mounts.33 Although they were not necessary,
they helped automize the acquisition. As mentioned earlier, the photon data was acquired
with a dwell time of 0.1 s, and stored automatically on a spreadsheet. We later sorted the
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data in the spreadsheet. Whenever we did not have one count in only one the two detectors
for Alice and Bob, we eliminated the entry, keeping only the cases that could potentially be
used to obtain the key.
Tables II and III show a sample of our results when Alice, Bob and Eve were set to the
same HV and DA bases, respectively. In our exercise we did 667 trials with equal settings
for all three parties and in 92 ± 8% of cases they agreed. The agreement in the HV basis
was greater than in the DA basis. This is likely due to not having perfect state fidelity. We
implemented the setup and the experiment within the undergraduate laboratory context,
with students (the first 2 authors) doing the alignments and the experiments. The error rate
of 8% was still below the 11% that is considered acceptable for generating a secret key.22
TABLE II. Sample data when Alice, Bob and Eve are in the HV basis (H=1, V=0).
Trial Alice Bob Agree?
1 0 0 X
2 0 0 X
3 0 0 X
4 1 1 X
5 1 1 X
6 0 0 X
7 1 1 X
8 0 0 X
9 0 0 X
10 0 0 X
We also took data with all the combinations of distinct bases. Tables IV and V are
representative samples of two important cases: when Alice and Bob had the same basis but
Eve had a different basis. As can be seen, they show many more discrepancies between
Alice and Bob due to Eve’s intervention. Out of 1320 trials of these two cases we found that
Alice’s and Bob’s results disagreed 28 ± 4% of the time, which is within the expectation of
25% (assuming that Eve chooses her basis randomly between HV and DA). We note that
these are the most basic considerations. In a real application other considerations come into
place, some of which we describe below.
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TABLE III. Sample data when Alice, Bob and Eve are in the DA basis (D=1, A=0).
Trial Alice Bob Agree?
1 0 0 X
2 1 1 X
3 1 1 X
4 0 1 ×
5 0 0 X
6 0 1 ×
7 0 0 X
8 0 0 X
9 0 0 X
10 1 1 X
TABLE IV. Sample data when Alice and Bob are in the HV basis, and Eve in the DA basis (H,D=1,
V,A=0).
Trial Alice Bob Agree?
1 1 1 X
2 0 0 X
3 1 0 ×
4 1 0 ×
5 1 1 X
6 1 1 X
7 1 1 X
8 0 1 ×
9 0 0 X
10 1 1 X
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TABLE V. Sample data when Alice and Bob are in the DA basis, and Eve in the HV basis (H,D=1,
V,A=0).
Trial Alice Bob Agree?
1 0 0 X
2 1 0 ×
3 1 1 X
4 1 0 ×
5 1 1 X
6 1 1 X
7 1 1 X
8 0 0 X
9 0 0 X
10 1 0 ×
V. OTHER MEASUREMENTS: QUANTUM STATE TOMOGRAPHY
This basic setup can be a template for other teaching moments. It can be used in the
context of teaching quantum mechanical principles and entanglement. The starting point of
this experiment is to create an entangled state. We do this by first aligning the apparatus and
measuring coincidence counts in the detectors consistent with the state being prepared.29
An extension of this experiment is to do a Bell test: either a Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) test,29,34 or other, such as the Hardy test.35 This involves doing 16 projective
measurements on the state of the light plus computation of the terms in the inequality. The
state without Eve will violate the Bell inequality, and the one with Eve will not.27
Another alternative could be to use the experiment in the context of quantum information,
and using it to extract the information conveyed by the light. This involves doing quantum
state tomography (QST) on the light. It entails also doing sixteen projective measurements
of the state of the two photons to obtain the density matrix of the state.36,37 To do this we
need two additional quarter-wave plates (QWP) so that we can measure right and left handed
circular polarization. In Appendix B we briefly describe how to do the 16 measurements
and obtain the density matrix of the light. A simple description of the density matrix
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has been presented before in this context.38 Briefly, if the basis is |H〉1|H〉2 = (1 0 0 0)T,
|H〉1|V 〉2 = (0 1 0 0)T, |V 〉1|H〉2 = (0 0 1 0)T and |V 〉1|V 〉2 = (0 0 0 1)T, then the density
matrix of the state of Eq. 5 is
ρψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| = 1
2


1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1


. (9)
Figure 3(a) shows the results of the quantum state tomography that we took of this state:
the bar figure is a standard pictorial way to represent the real component of the matrix
elements of the density matrix, with the height of the bar representing the value of the
matrix element. As can be seen, the figure faithfully represents the expected form of Eq. 9:
predominantly 4 bars at the 4 corners of the matrix with values close to 0.5: ρ11 = 0.49,
ρ14 = 0.47, ρ41 = 0.47 and ρ44 = 0.51.
The previous tomography measurement was made without Eve. We followed by adding
Eve, an 8-mm-thick quartz plate, as mentioned earlier, with its axis vertical. In this case the
optic representing Eve decohered the horizontal and vertical components of Bob’s photon,
which is equivalent to rendering the light in the mixed state given by
ρw/Eve =
1
2
|H〉1|H〉2〈H|1〈H|2 +
1
2
|V 〉1|V 〉2〈V |1〈V |2 =
1
2


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1


. (10)
The tomography of this state is shown in Fig. 3(b), which nicely reflects the expectation of
Eq. 10: the bars for the 2 corners have values ρ11 = 0.48, ρ44 = 0.52, whereas the other
elements had values in absolute value below 0.05 (e.g., the complex matrix elements were
ρ41 = ρ
∗
14 = 0.024 + 0.021i and ρ43 = ρ
∗
34 = −0.034− 0.036i).
By knowing the density matrix one can obtain useful measures of the state of the light.
They include the tangle, a measure of the entanglement (0 = not entangled; 1 = fully
entangled). The von Neumann or quantum Shannon entropy is given by2
S = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) = −
∑
i
λi log2 λi, (11)
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where λi are the eigenvalues of the density matrix (and with 0 log2 0 ≡ 0). S is a measure
of the uncertainty in the information (0 = no uncertainty, state is well defined), and 1 =
full uncertainty, state is undefined). It is easy to show that S = 0 for ρψ (due to λ1 = 1,
λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0) and S = 1 for ρw/Eve (due to λ1 = λ2 = 1/2 and λ3 = λ4 = 0). The linear
entropy is another measure of the degree of mixture (0 = not mixed; 1 = fully mixed- or
all basis states populated evenly and incoherently). The fidelity is the probability that the
measured state is ψ. The results for the states just mentioned are given in Table VI. We
can see that when Eve is not present we have a highly entangled state, with a high value of
tangle and a low value of the von Neumann entropy, reflecting a high certainty in the state
of the light and a high probability that it is in state ψ. When Eve is present, the tangle is
nearly zero and the von Neumann entropy is consistent with 1, revealing full uncertainty in
the state of the light (i..e, per density matrix, 48% chance that it is in state |H〉1|H〉2 and
52% that it is in state |V 〉1|V 〉2). The state is not fully mixed, although mixed enough to
contain no information. We also did tomography for the diagonal setting of Eve (Fig. 3(c))
and confirmed that the tangle is low and the entropy was high, as shown in the third entry
of the table. The density matrix for this case, is quite different than the one when Eve is
aligned with the vertical.
TABLE VI. Quantum state tomography of the state of the light for 3 different cases. Full Eve
consists of inserting a 0.64-mm thick quartz plate; and for partial Eve we inserted a 1-mm thick
quartz plate. In both cases the crystal axis aligned with the vertical.
Case Tangle von Neumann Entropy Linear Entropy Fidelity
Without Eve 0.96 ± 0.05 0.1± 0.2 0.03 ± 0.08 0.97
Full Eve aligned vertical 0.004 ± 0.002 1.0± 0.2 0.66 ± 0.03 0.52
Full Eve aligned diagonal 0.001 ± 0.002 1.1± 0.5 0.68 ± 0.04 0.50
Partial Eve 0.68 ± 0.08 0.45 ± 0.14 0.22 ± 0.10 0.88
We did an additional test with what we call “partial Eve”. That is, we used a quartz
plate of thickness 0.64 mm. It was a multiple-order waveplate that was available in the
lab from a previous project. The thickness of the plate only partially decohered the state.
Thus we would expect to produce a state that showed some entanglement and some degree of
mixture. Figure 3 indeed shows some resemblance of the initial state, and per Table VI, with
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FIG. 3. Bar graph of the measured real component of the density matrix of the state of the light
received by Alice and Bob before their joint measurement. The cases include: (a) when Eve is not
present, (b) When Eve decoheres in the HV basis, (c) when Eve decoheres in the DA basis, and
(d) when Eve performs partial decoherence.
reduced tangle and a von Neumann entropy in between maximum and minimum uncertainty.
Interestingly, in the context of quantum communication, the latter optic mimics the effect
of Eve doing intercept and resend of only a fraction of the photons that Alice sends to Bob,
obtaining partial information about the communication possibly without being detected.
For example, if Eve picked only 1/2 of the photons while alternating equally between HV
and DA bases, there would be a probability of 1/8 that Alice and Bob will get errors from the
eavesdropping. (If the error rate is low enough this knowledge can be eliminated by privacy
amplification, explained in Appendix A.) A more exhaustive analysis of this situation can
be done but we considered it beyond the scope of our project. In Appendix B we give a
brief explanation of the measurements that entail quantum state tomography.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we presented in this article a laboratory demonstration of the technique
to generate a cryptographic key in the context of QKD using single photons. This is the
simplest type of QKD but suffices to convey the spirit of the technology. Undergraduate
coauthors were involved in the setup, alignment and data acquisition. The most significant
aspect of the demonstration was the use of a thick quartz plate to mimic the intercept and
resent action of the eavesdropper. We also present an analysis of the state of the light using
quantum state tomography that illustrates the effect of the eavesdropper on the state of the
light.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was funded by National Science Foundation grant PHY-150062.
∗ egalvez@colgate.edu
1 F.W. Stauch, “Resource Letter QI-1: Quantum Information,” Am. J. Phys. 84, 495-507 (2016).
2 M.A. Nielsen and I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000).
3 E.J. Galvez, “Resource Letter SPE-1: Single-Photon Experiments in the Undergraduate Labo-
ratory” Am. J. Phys. 82, 1018–1028 (2014).
4 P.A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics (Oxford, 4th Ed. 1930).
5 C.A. Fuchs and A. Peres “Quantum-state disturbance versus information gain: Uncertainty
relations for quantum information,” Phys. Rev. A 53, 2038-2045 (1996).
6 S. Loepp and W.K. Wooters, Protecting Information: From Classical Error Correction to Quan-
tum Cryptography (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7 M. Raymer, Quantum Physics (Oxford University Press, New York, 2017).
8 S. DeVore and C. Singh, “Development of an interactive tutorial on quantum key distribution,”
Phys. Ed. Res. Conf. Proc., 59-62 (2014).
9 A. Kohnle and A. Rizzoli “Interactive simulations for quantum key distribution,” Eur. J. Phys.
38, 035403 (2017).
20
10 A.N. Utama, L. Jianwei, and M.A. Seidler, “A hands-on quantum cryptography workshop for
pre-university students,” arxvii:1911.02565v1 (2019).
11 Thorlabs, “EDU-QCRY1 Quantum Cryptography Demonstration Kit” URL:https://www.
thorlabs.com
12 J.J. Sakurai Modern Quantum Mechanics (Addison Wesley, Reading 1994).
13 W.K. Wootters and W.H. Zurek, “A single quantum cannot be cloned” Nature 299, 802-803
(1982).
14 J.S. Townsend, A modern approach to quantum mechanics (University Science Books, 2012).
15 M. Beck, Quantum Mechanics: Theory and Experiment (Oxford University Press, 2012).
16 C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, R. Jozsa, A. Peres and W.K. Wootters, “Teleporting an
unknown quantum state via dual classical and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen channels” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 70, 1895–1899 (1993).
17 D. Bouwmeester, J.-W. Pan, K. Mattle, M. Eibl, H. Weinfurter, and A. Zeilinger, “Experimental
quantum teleportation” Nature 390, 575–579 (1997).
18 D.H. McIntyre, Quantum Mechanics: A Paradigms Approach (Pearson Education Inc., San
Francisco, 2012).
19 N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography” Rev. Mod. Phys.
74, 145-195 (2002).
20 V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N.J. Cerf, M. Dusek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The
security of practical quantum key distribution” Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301–1350 (2009).
21 H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, “Secure quantum key distribution,” Nat. Photon. 8, 595-
604 (2014).
22 F. Bouchard, K. Heshami, D. England, R. Fickler, R.W. Boyd, B.-G. Englert, L.L. Sa´nchez-
Soto, and E. Karimi, “Experimental investigation of high-dimensional quantum key distribution
protocols with twisted photons” Quantum 2, 111-123 (2018).
23 X.-B. Wang, “Beating the photon-number-splitting attacks in practical quantum cryptography,”
Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
24 H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy state quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
25 T. Kupko, M. von Helversen, L. Rickert, J.-H. Schulze, A. Strittmatter, M. Gschrey, S. Rodt, S.
Reitzenstein, and T. Heindel, “Tools for the performance optimization of single-photon quantum
21
key distribution,” Nat. Photon. 6, 29 (2020).
26 C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin
tossing” in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal
Processing, (IEEE Press, Bangalore, 1984).
27 A. Ekert, “Quantum Cryptography based on Bell’s Theorem” Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661-663
(1991).
28 P.G. Kwiat, E. Waks, A. White, I. Appelbaum, and P. Eberhard, “Ultrabright source of
polarization-entangled photons,” Phys. Rev. A 60, 773–776 (1999).
29 D. Dehlinger and M. Mitchell, “Entangled photons, nonlocality, and Bell inequalities in the
undergraduate laboratory,” Am. J. Phys. 70, 903–910 (2002).
30 R. Rangarajan, M. Goggin, and P. Kwiat, “Optimizing type-I polarization-entangled photons,”
Opt. Express 17, 18920 (2009).
31 E.J. Galvez, “Photon quantum mechanics,” URL:https://egalvez.colgate.domains/pql/
32 D.S. Naik, C.G. Peterson, A.G. White, A.J. Berglund, and P.G. Kwiat “Entangled State Quan-
tum Cryptography: Eavesdropping on the Ekert Protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4733 (2000).
33 E. Toninelli, B. Ndagano, A. Valle´s, B. Sephton, I. Nape, A. Ambrosio, F. Capasso, M.J.
Padgett, and A. Forbes, “Concepts in quantum state tomographyand classical implementation
with intense light: a tutorial,” Adv. Opt. Photon. 11, 67-134 (2019).
34 J.F. Clauser, M.A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R.A. Holt, “Proposed experiment to test local
hidden-variable theories,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880884 (1969).
35 J.A. Carlson, M.D. Olmstead, and M. Beck, “Quantum mysteries tested: An experiment im-
plementing Hardy’s test of local realism,” Am. J. Phys. 74, 180-186 (2006).
36 D.F.V. James, P.G. Kwiat, W.J. Munro, and A.G. White, “Measurement of qubits,” Phys. Rev.
A 64, 052312 (2001).
37 J.B. Altepeter, E.R. Jeffrey, and P.G. Kwiat, “Photonic state tomography,” Adv. At. Mol. Phys.
52,105-159 (2005).
38 E.J. Galvez “Qubit quantum mechanics with correlated-photon experiments,” Am. J. Phys. 78,
510-519 (2010).
39 Kwiat Quantum Information Group “Guide to Quantum State Tomography” URL:http://
research.physics.illinois.edu/QI/Photonics/Tomography/.
22
VII. APPENDIX A: COMMUNICATING WITH THE KEY
In the communication leading to obtaining the key, Alice sends Bob a stream of photons
entangled with the ones she keeps. Next they share over a public channel (that is, through
a non-secret communication) the bases that they used for each pair of photons. Then they
both keep only the data obtained when both used the same basis (HV or DA). This leaves
them with a key that is in principle identical for both. Note that Alice, Bob and in principle
others, including Eve, know the bases that they used but only Alice and Bob know the
outcome of the measurements, which by quantum mechanics are identical. Thus, they each
generated the same key without transmitting it explicitly to each other.
At this point Alice and Bob must determine whether there is an eavesdropper or not.
This involves sharing a fraction of their key (via a random sampling), and to look for errors.
It is here where information theory comes into action. From a simple analysis, if the errors
exceed 25% , then that is indicative that there is an eavesdropper and the key has to be
discarded. Additionally, there are always some errors due to instrumental effects or noise,
although it is impossible to distinguish them from an eavesdropper attack. If the error rate is
below some predetermined percentage, either from instrumental imperfections or Eve under-
sampling in her intrusion, Bob and Alice conclude it is ok to proceed and follow steps to
correct the errors; a process known as error correction or information reconciliation. Briefly,
it involves exchanging the parity of blocks of binary data in a recursive way so that the errors
are effectively corrected. Once the errors are corrected, Alice and Bob have the same key.
However, the error-correction step may have revealed some information to the eavesdropper,
so a second step in the process, called privacy amplification, involves obtaining a smaller key
obtained operations between parts of the longer key. This step insures that the eavesdropper
has no access to the final key because it involves operations with data she does not have.
There is a huge body of technical literature on this subject, but the recent textbook gives
simple and clear explanations of these last two steps.6
Suppose now that Alice and Bob have a key and wish to communicate. The message is
converted to binary consisting of N data bits Di (i = 1, 2 . . .N). The key also consists of
binary bits, so Alice uses N key bits Ki. The bits of the encrypted message Ei are obtained
by applying the exclusive-OR operation (XOR = ⊗) between the data and the key, bit by
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bit:
Ei = Di ⊗Ki = Di ·K ′i +D′i ·Ki, (12)
where “·” and “+” are the Boolean operations AND and OR, respectively, and the prime
on a variable denotes the NOT operation. When Bob receives the sequence of bits he gets
the original message bits by applying the XOR operation between the encrypted bits and
the key bits. The result is the message bits. This is possible due to the relation:
Ei ⊗Ki = Di (13)
If can be left as an exercise for the student to prove the previous expression by applying the
following Boolean identities between variables A and B:
(A+B)′ = A′ · B′ (14)
A · A′ = 0 (15)
A+ A′ = 1. (16)
As a subsequent exercise, the student can be asked to verify the relations with a numerical
sequence of message bits and key bits, and following the XOR truth table given in Table VII
(this is the same as binary addition modulo 2).
TABLE VII. Truth table for the XOR Boolean operation for 2 bits.
A B A⊗B
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
VIII. APPENDIX B: QUANTUM STATE TOMOGRAPHY OF PHOTON PAIRS
The state of the light is most accurately represented by the density matrix. In the case
of 2 qubits presented here, the density matrix is a 4 × 4 Hermitian matrix, which has 4
real diagonal elements ρii (with
∑
i ρii = 1) and 12 complex off-diagonal elements with
ρij = ρ
∗
ji. These plus the total photon count add to a total of 16 unknown quantities. QST
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can then be done by making 16 projective measurements. The matrix elements are obtained
from linear combinations of the measurements plus an optimization that enforces Hermitian
properties.36
The measurements involved projecting the state of the light through polarization filters
(one for Alice and one for Bob). Projection onto a given state, say |H〉, is achieved by setting
polarization optics such that a photon in that state is transmitted without attenuation, and
conversely the state orthogonal to it (|V 〉) would be fully blocked. Projection onto state
|H〉, involves a filter that is a horizontal polarizer. Similar argument follows with the other
linear states |V 〉, |D〉 and |A〉. Because projections onto the right and left circular states
(|R〉 and |L〉, respectively) are needed, we need to add a quarter-wave plate QWP in front
of the polarizer. When detecting the linear states, the QWP should not affect the state.
Therefore, it should be aligned along the same direction as the input polarization. The way
to make filters for |R〉 and |L〉 consists of aligning the fast axis of the QWP along a given
direction and follow it with the polarizer with transmission axis aligned 45-degrees relative
to the fast axis of the QWP, counter-clockwise for detecting |R〉 and clockwise for |L〉, when
looking into the incoming beam. The 16 filter settings for Alice and Bob are: HH, HV, VV,
VH, RH, RV, DV, DH, DR, DD,RD, HD, VD, VL, HL, RL.36
In the QKD apparatus we used Thompson prisms as polarization splitters for both Alice
and Bob, with the V state transmitted and H state deflected. To avoid inconsistencies due to
differing detector efficiencies we did all the measurements with the recordings of the straight
output of the two Thompson prisms. Because the prisms were fixed, the HWP before each
prism had to be adjusted appropriately. A summary of settings is given in Table VIII.
Once the coincidence readings for each of the 16 setting is obtained, it is fed into the
QST program that computes the density matrix and quantum measures. We used a program
based on an online resource from Paul Kwiat’s research group.39 We can also provide our
own version of the program upon request.
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TABLE VIII. Angles of quarter and HWPs for produce the appropriate filtering action when the
two waveplates are followed by a vertical polarizer. Angles are in degrees, with positive being
counter-clockwise looking into the beam, and zero being the vertical direction.
State Qwp Hwp
H 90 45
V 0 0
D −45 −22.5
A +45 +22.5
R 0 +45
L 0 −45
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